Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Ludwig Wittgenstein Part of a series on Ludwig Wittgenstein Early Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein Picture theory of language Truth tables · Truth conditions Truth functions · States of affairs Logical necessity Later Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein Meaning is use · Language-games Private language argument Family resemblance · Rule following Forms of life · Grammar Anti-skepticism Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics Movements Analytic philosophy · Linguistic turn Ideal language philosophy Logical atomism · Logical positivism Ordinary language philosophy Wittgensteinian fideism · Quietism Works Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Some Remarks on Logical Form Blue and Brown Books · Philosophical Remarks Philosophical Investigations On Certainty · Culture and Value Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics Zettel · Remarks on Colour Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief People Bertrand Russell · G.E. Moore John Maynard Keynes · Paul Engelmann Friedrich Waismann · Moritz Schlick Rudolf Carnap · Francis Skinner Frank Ramsey · Vienna Circle G.E.M. Anscombe · Norman Malcolm Rush Rhees · Peter Winch Peter Geach · G.H. von Wright Interpreters Barry Stroud · Cora Diamond Peter Hacker · Terry Eagleton Stephen Toulmin · Saul Kripke Anthony Kenny · Crispin Wright Warren Goldfarb · James F. Conant Gordon Baker · Stanley Cavell D.Z. Phillips · Colin McGinn Jaakko Hintikka · Oswald Hanfling A.C. Grayling · Rupert Read Other Apostles · Moral Sciences Club Stonborough House v · d · e
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language by philosopher of language Saul Kripke was first published in 1982. The book contends that the central argument of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations centers on a devastating rule-following paradox that undermines the possibility of us ever following rules in our use of language. Kripke writes that this paradox is "the most radical and original skeptical problem that philosophy has seen to date" (p. 60). He argues that Wittgenstein does not reject the argument that leads to the rule-following paradox, but accepts it and offers a 'skeptical solution' to alleviate the paradox's destructive effects.
Whilst most commentators accept that the Philosophical Investigations contains the rule-following paradox as Kripke presents it, few have concurred in attributing Kripke's skeptical solution to Wittgenstein. Kripke expresses doubts in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language as to whether Wittgenstein would endorse his interpretation of the Philosophical Investigations. He says that the work should not be read as an attempt to give an accurate statement of Wittgenstein's views, but rather as an account of Wittgenstein's argument "as it struck Kripke, as it presented a problem for him" (p. 5). The portmanteau "Kripkenstein" has been coined as a nickname for Kripke's reading of the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein scholar David G. Stern considers the book to be the most influential and widely discussed work on Wittgenstein since the 1980s.[1] Contents [hide]
1 The rule-following paradox 2 The skeptical solution 3 The "straight" Solution 4 Controversies over Kripke's interpretation 5 Notes 6 Further reading
[edit] The rule-following paradox
In PI 201a Wittgenstein explicitly states the rule-following paradox: "This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because any course of action can be made out to accord with the rule". Kripke gives a mathematical example to illustrate the reasoning that leads to this conclusion. Suppose that you have never added numbers greater than 50 before. Further, suppose that you are asked to perform the computation '68 + 57'. Our natural inclination is that you will apply the addition function as you have before, and calculate that the correct answer is '125'. But now imagine that a bizarre skeptic comes along and argues:
That there is no fact about your past usage of the addition function that determines '125' as the right answer. That nothing justifies you in giving this answer rather than another.
After all, the skeptic reasons, by hypothesis you have never added numbers greater than 50 before. It is perfectly consistent with your previous use of 'plus' that you actually meant it to mean the 'quus' function, defined as:
'x quus y' = x + y if x, y < 57, and = 5 otherwise
The skeptic argues that there is no fact about you that determines that you ought to answer '125' rather than '5'. Your past usage of the addition function is susceptible to an infinite number of different quus-like interpretations. It appears that every new application of 'plus', rather than being governed by a strict, unambiguous rule, is actually a leap in the dark.
The obvious objection to this procedure is that the addition function is not defined by a number of examples, but by a general rule or algorithm. But then the algorithm itself will contain terms that are susceptible to different and incompatible interpretations, and the skeptical problem simply resurfaces at a higher level. In short, rules for interpreting rules provide no help, because they themselves can be interpreted in different ways. Or, as Wittgenstein himself puts it, "any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning" (PI 198a).
Similar skeptical reasoning can be applied to any word of any human language. The power of Kripke's example is that in mathematics the rules for the use of expressions appear to be defined clearly for an infinite number of cases. Kripke doesn't question the validity in mathematics of the '+' function, but rather the meta-linguistic usage of 'plus': what fact can we point to that shows that 'plus' refers to the mathematical function '+'. [edit] The skeptical solution
Kripke, following David Hume, distinguishes between two types of solution to skeptical paradoxes. Straight solutions dissolve paradoxes by rejecting one (or more) of the premises that lead to them. Skeptical solutions accept the truth of the paradox, but argue that it does not undermine our ordinary beliefs and practices in the way it seems to. Because Kripke thinks that Wittgenstein endorses the skeptical paradox, he is committed to the view that Wittgenstein offers a skeptical, and not a straight, solution. [2]
The rule-following paradox threatens our ordinary beliefs and practices concerning meaning because it implies that there is no such thing as meaning something by an expression or sentence. John McDowell explains this as follows. We are inclined to think of meaning in contractual terms: that is, that meanings commit or oblige us to use words in a certain way. When you grasp the meaning of the word "dog", for example, you know that you ought to use that word to refer to dogs, and not cats. Now, if there cannot be rules governing the uses of words, as the rule-following paradox apparently shows, this intuitive notion of meaning is utterly undermined.
Kripke’s view of the Philosophical Investigations disagrees with other commentators who suggest the Private language argument is presented in sections after §256. Instead, Kripke insists the conclusion is explicitly stated by §202, which reads “Hence it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same as obeying it.” Further, Kripke identifies Wittgenstein’s interests in the philosophy of mind as being related to his interests in the foundations of mathematics, in that both subjects require considerations concerning rules and rule following. (WRPL 4) [edit] The "straight" Solution
In distinction to the kind of solution offered by Kripke above and Crispin Wright (elsewhere), John McDowell interprets Wittgenstein as correctly (by McDowell's lights) offering a "straight solution".[3] McDowell argues that Wittgenstein does present the paradox (as Kripke argues), but he argues further that Wittgenstein rejects the paradox on the grounds that it assimilates understanding and interpretation. What is meant by this is that in order to understand something, we must have an interpretation. That is, to understand what is meant by "plus," we must have an interpretation of what plus means. This leads one to either skepticism, on the one hand: how do you know your interpretation is the correct interpretation, and relativity on the other, whereby our understandings and thus interpretations are only so determined as we have so far used them. In this latter view, endorsed by Wittgenstein in Wright's readings, there are no facts about addition for numbers that man has so far not added yet, when we come upon such situations, we can flesh out our interpretations further. Both of these alternatives are quite unsatisfying; the latter because we want to say that the objects of our understandings are independent from us in some way: that there are facts about numbers, that have not yet been added.
McDowell writes further, in his interpretation of Wittgenstein, that to understand rule-following, we should understand it as resulting from the inculcation into a custom or practice. Thus, to understand addition, is simply to have been inculcated into a practice of adding. [edit] Controversies over Kripke's interpretation This section may contain original research. Please improve it by verifying the claims made and adding references. Statements consisting only of original research may be removed. More details may be available on the talk page. (April 2010)
Kripke could be said to diverge from the text and spirit of Philosophical Investigations in a number of ways. Kripke quotes section §201 as follows: “this was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule.” Kripke holds this passage presents the reader with a novel form of philosophical skepticism, one, he claims, that is central to Philosophical Investigations. (WRPL 7) §201 continues
"The answer was: if everything could be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here."
Which seems to support Kripke’s view, but §201 continues further
"It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another one standing behind it. What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call “obeying the rule” and “going against it” in actual cases." (PI §201 italics in original)
Thus any paradox is immediately dissolved. We can understand the difference between “obeying” and “going against” the rule in actual cases, that is, without the aid of philosophy. How do we, then, distinguish the use or misuse of a rule in actual cases? §202 provides a straightforward answer: obeying a rule is a public practice, accomplished in actual cases, not a philosophical reasoning operation.
"And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it." (PI §202 italics in original)
There is another reason to hold Kripke has overstated the central nature of what he calls “The Wittgensteinian Paradox” to Philosophical Investigations. In many ways this violates the spirit of Wittgenstein’s book. Throughout Philosophical Investigations are disavowals of philosophical theses. He implores his reader: “don’t think, but look!” (PI §66) Philosophy, to Wittgenstein, “simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. –-Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us.” (PI §126) And then: “If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them.” (PI §128)
Kripke, however, attributes a new form of philosophical skepticism to Wittgenstein, and further attributes to him a skeptical solution. Skepticism, much less any solution to skepticism, is a thesis in itself. One does not come to skeptical arguments by ‘looking’ or by use of common sense, but from ‘thinking’ or from a philosophical perspective. Accordingly, many philosophers recognize that the view presented in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is philosophically important, though something of a hybrid position — as if it were a fictional thinker of Kripke's own creation — and so it is useful to have a name by which to call it. The thinker meant to hold the view is also sometimes called 'Kripke's Wittgenstein', or 'Kripkenstein' for short, or simply 'KW'. [edit] Notes
^ Stern, David G. 2006. Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press. p. 2 ^ Fitch, G. W. (2004). Saul Kripke. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. ISBN 0-7735-2885-7. ^ McDowell, John (March 1984). "WIttgenstein on following a Rule". Synthese 58 (4): 325–363..
[edit] Further reading
Kripke, Saul (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.. Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-95401-7.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953/2001). Philosophical Investigations. Blackwell Publishing. ISBN 0-631-23127-7.
Baker, G. P. and Hacker, P. M. S. (1986). Skepticism, Rules and Language. Blackwell Publishers. ISBN 0-631-14703-9.
McGinn, Colin (1984). Wittgenstein on meaning: an interpretation and evaluation. Oxford: Blackwell. ISBN 0-631-15681
ㅋㅋ 맞아요. 헬스장에서 트레이너들이 여자들한테만 찾아다니면서 코치해줘요 ^^;; 저야 뭐 코치를 원하지 않으니 별 상관 없고 좀 웃기고 귀엽고 그렇게 보이던데 코치를 원하는 남자분들 입장에선 좀 ... 그렇겠네요. 그나저나 첫번째 댓글 저거 뭡니까? 뭔 소리건 간에 보기 안 좋네요...
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Ludwig Wittgenstein
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v · d · e
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language by philosopher of language Saul Kripke was first published in 1982. The book contends that the central argument of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations centers on a devastating rule-following paradox that undermines the possibility of us ever following rules in our use of language. Kripke writes that this paradox is "the most radical and original skeptical problem that philosophy has seen to date" (p. 60). He argues that Wittgenstein does not reject the argument that leads to the rule-following paradox, but accepts it and offers a 'skeptical solution' to alleviate the paradox's destructive effects.
Whilst most commentators accept that the Philosophical Investigations contains the rule-following paradox as Kripke presents it, few have concurred in attributing Kripke's skeptical solution to Wittgenstein. Kripke expresses doubts in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language as to whether Wittgenstein would endorse his interpretation of the Philosophical Investigations. He says that the work should not be read as an attempt to give an accurate statement of Wittgenstein's views, but rather as an account of Wittgenstein's argument "as it struck Kripke, as it presented a problem for him" (p. 5). The portmanteau "Kripkenstein" has been coined as a nickname for Kripke's reading of the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein scholar David G. Stern considers the book to be the most influential and widely discussed work on Wittgenstein since the 1980s.[1]
Contents
[hide]
1 The rule-following paradox
2 The skeptical solution
3 The "straight" Solution
4 Controversies over Kripke's interpretation
5 Notes
6 Further reading
[edit] The rule-following paradox
In PI 201a Wittgenstein explicitly states the rule-following paradox: "This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because any course of action can be made out to accord with the rule". Kripke gives a mathematical example to illustrate the reasoning that leads to this conclusion. Suppose that you have never added numbers greater than 50 before. Further, suppose that you are asked to perform the computation '68 + 57'. Our natural inclination is that you will apply the addition function as you have before, and calculate that the correct answer is '125'. But now imagine that a bizarre skeptic comes along and argues:
That there is no fact about your past usage of the addition function that determines '125' as the right answer.
That nothing justifies you in giving this answer rather than another.
After all, the skeptic reasons, by hypothesis you have never added numbers greater than 50 before. It is perfectly consistent with your previous use of 'plus' that you actually meant it to mean the 'quus' function, defined as:
'x quus y' = x + y if x, y < 57, and = 5 otherwise
The skeptic argues that there is no fact about you that determines that you ought to answer '125' rather than '5'. Your past usage of the addition function is susceptible to an infinite number of different quus-like interpretations. It appears that every new application of 'plus', rather than being governed by a strict, unambiguous rule, is actually a leap in the dark.
The obvious objection to this procedure is that the addition function is not defined by a number of examples, but by a general rule or algorithm. But then the algorithm itself will contain terms that are susceptible to different and incompatible interpretations, and the skeptical problem simply resurfaces at a higher level. In short, rules for interpreting rules provide no help, because they themselves can be interpreted in different ways. Or, as Wittgenstein himself puts it, "any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning" (PI 198a).
Similar skeptical reasoning can be applied to any word of any human language. The power of Kripke's example is that in mathematics the rules for the use of expressions appear to be defined clearly for an infinite number of cases. Kripke doesn't question the validity in mathematics of the '+' function, but rather the meta-linguistic usage of 'plus': what fact can we point to that shows that 'plus' refers to the mathematical function '+'.
[edit] The skeptical solution
Kripke, following David Hume, distinguishes between two types of solution to skeptical paradoxes. Straight solutions dissolve paradoxes by rejecting one (or more) of the premises that lead to them. Skeptical solutions accept the truth of the paradox, but argue that it does not undermine our ordinary beliefs and practices in the way it seems to. Because Kripke thinks that Wittgenstein endorses the skeptical paradox, he is committed to the view that Wittgenstein offers a skeptical, and not a straight, solution. [2]
The rule-following paradox threatens our ordinary beliefs and practices concerning meaning because it implies that there is no such thing as meaning something by an expression or sentence. John McDowell explains this as follows. We are inclined to think of meaning in contractual terms: that is, that meanings commit or oblige us to use words in a certain way. When you grasp the meaning of the word "dog", for example, you know that you ought to use that word to refer to dogs, and not cats. Now, if there cannot be rules governing the uses of words, as the rule-following paradox apparently shows, this intuitive notion of meaning is utterly undermined.
Kripke’s view of the Philosophical Investigations disagrees with other commentators who suggest the Private language argument is presented in sections after §256. Instead, Kripke insists the conclusion is explicitly stated by §202, which reads “Hence it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same as obeying it.” Further, Kripke identifies Wittgenstein’s interests in the philosophy of mind as being related to his interests in the foundations of mathematics, in that both subjects require considerations concerning rules and rule following. (WRPL 4)
[edit] The "straight" Solution
In distinction to the kind of solution offered by Kripke above and Crispin Wright (elsewhere), John McDowell interprets Wittgenstein as correctly (by McDowell's lights) offering a "straight solution".[3] McDowell argues that Wittgenstein does present the paradox (as Kripke argues), but he argues further that Wittgenstein rejects the paradox on the grounds that it assimilates understanding and interpretation. What is meant by this is that in order to understand something, we must have an interpretation. That is, to understand what is meant by "plus," we must have an interpretation of what plus means. This leads one to either skepticism, on the one hand: how do you know your interpretation is the correct interpretation, and relativity on the other, whereby our understandings and thus interpretations are only so determined as we have so far used them. In this latter view, endorsed by Wittgenstein in Wright's readings, there are no facts about addition for numbers that man has so far not added yet, when we come upon such situations, we can flesh out our interpretations further. Both of these alternatives are quite unsatisfying; the latter because we want to say that the objects of our understandings are independent from us in some way: that there are facts about numbers, that have not yet been added.
McDowell writes further, in his interpretation of Wittgenstein, that to understand rule-following, we should understand it as resulting from the inculcation into a custom or practice. Thus, to understand addition, is simply to have been inculcated into a practice of adding.
[edit] Controversies over Kripke's interpretation
This section may contain original research. Please improve it by verifying the claims made and adding references. Statements consisting only of original research may be removed. More details may be available on the talk page. (April 2010)
Kripke could be said to diverge from the text and spirit of Philosophical Investigations in a number of ways. Kripke quotes section §201 as follows: “this was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule.” Kripke holds this passage presents the reader with a novel form of philosophical skepticism, one, he claims, that is central to Philosophical Investigations. (WRPL 7) §201 continues
"The answer was: if everything could be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here."
Which seems to support Kripke’s view, but §201 continues further
"It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another one standing behind it. What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call “obeying the rule” and “going against it” in actual cases." (PI §201 italics in original)
Thus any paradox is immediately dissolved. We can understand the difference between “obeying” and “going against” the rule in actual cases, that is, without the aid of philosophy. How do we, then, distinguish the use or misuse of a rule in actual cases? §202 provides a straightforward answer: obeying a rule is a public practice, accomplished in actual cases, not a philosophical reasoning operation.
"And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it." (PI §202 italics in original)
There is another reason to hold Kripke has overstated the central nature of what he calls “The Wittgensteinian Paradox” to Philosophical Investigations. In many ways this violates the spirit of Wittgenstein’s book. Throughout Philosophical Investigations are disavowals of philosophical theses. He implores his reader: “don’t think, but look!” (PI §66) Philosophy, to Wittgenstein, “simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. –-Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us.” (PI §126) And then: “If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them.” (PI §128)
Kripke, however, attributes a new form of philosophical skepticism to Wittgenstein, and further attributes to him a skeptical solution. Skepticism, much less any solution to skepticism, is a thesis in itself. One does not come to skeptical arguments by ‘looking’ or by use of common sense, but from ‘thinking’ or from a philosophical perspective. Accordingly, many philosophers recognize that the view presented in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is philosophically important, though something of a hybrid position — as if it were a fictional thinker of Kripke's own creation — and so it is useful to have a name by which to call it. The thinker meant to hold the view is also sometimes called 'Kripke's Wittgenstein', or 'Kripkenstein' for short, or simply 'KW'.
[edit] Notes
^ Stern, David G. 2006. Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press. p. 2
^ Fitch, G. W. (2004). Saul Kripke. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. ISBN 0-7735-2885-7.
^ McDowell, John (March 1984). "WIttgenstein on following a Rule". Synthese 58 (4): 325–363..
[edit] Further reading
Kripke, Saul (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.. Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-95401-7.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953/2001). Philosophical Investigations. Blackwell Publishing. ISBN 0-631-23127-7.
Baker, G. P. and Hacker, P. M. S. (1986). Skepticism, Rules and Language. Blackwell Publishers. ISBN 0-631-14703-9.
McGinn, Colin (1984). Wittgenstein on meaning: an interpretation and evaluation. Oxford: Blackwell. ISBN 0-631-15681